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Abstract
This paper analyzes the political economics of the composition of taxes. Taxes may
be levied on income, or on expenditure, with the median voter pivotal in the theoretical
framework analyzed. As in Meltzer and Richard (1981) income taxes increase with inequal-
ity. Conversely expenditure taxes rst increase and then decrease with increasing inequality.
The extent to which taxes are levied on income relative to expenditure unambiguously rises
with inequality. In contrast to government size evidence, cross-country data exhibit a robust
positive correlation between the extent to which taxes are levied on income relative to expen-
diture, and inequality. Consistent with the theory this relationship holds most signicantly
in stronger democracies.
1 Introduction
What determines scal policy in democracies? A canonical theoretical result derived by
Meltzer and Richard (1981), building on Romer (1975), is that the size of government in-
creases with the degree of inequality in the pre-tax income distribution. This paper develops
the Meltzer and Richard (1981) hypothesis to consider the composition of taxes, and in par-
ticular the setting of income versus expenditure taxes. The main theoretical prediction is
that the extent to which taxes are levied on income relative to expenditure increases with
inequality. Cross-country evidence supports this hypothesis.
Cross country evidence testing the Meltzer and Richard (1981) hypothesis is predom-
inantly unsupportive. For example Perotti (1996), Bassett et al (1999) and Persson and
Tabellini (2003) all nd that the size of government is either insignicantly and/or nega-
tively related to measures of inequality. In response, new theories have emerged through
which high levels of inequality can coexist with small government under democracy. Pers-
son (1995) and Benabou (2000) separately identify roles for government in solving particular
market failures - respectively excessive labor supply when utility is derived relatively, and un-
derinvestment due to capital market imperfections. The capacity of the electorate to agree
on the role of government increases with equality, hence government size increases with
equality.1 Rodriguez (2004) instead proposes that the power of the rich to inuence policy
increases with inequality. Ultimately, and as also concluded by Borck (2007), the theoreti-
cal relationship between total redistribution and inequality extends beyond the mechanism
1A separate possibility advanced by Benabou and Ok (2001) is that the prospect of upward income
mobility will limit the demand for redistribution under rational expectations. However, the Great Gatsby
curve (Krueger, 2012) undermines this argument somewhat as a full reconciliation with the data.
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analyzed in Meltzer and Richard (1981). There are multiple channels linking the total size
of the government with inequality.
Also in the cross-country context there are many potential determinants of the total size
of government beyond the income distribution.2 Socioeconomic, historical and institutional
di¤erences may account for observed di¤erences in government size, and indeed undoubtedly
also co-determine di¤erences in the income distribution. The broader literature on the size
of government catalogues income levels (Wagners law, analyzed in Ram, 1987), ideology
(Pickering and Rockey, 2011), demographic change (Razin et al 2002), openness (Rodrik,
1998), country size (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998) and fragmentation (Alesina et al, 1999).
Public choice theory characterizes the size of government as the outcome of the power of a
bureaucracy that has the capacity to sustain itself (Niskanen, 1971), which also may di¤er
across institutional settings. Persson and Tabellini (1999) and Persson et al (2000) stress the
importance of constitutional rules in determining government size.3 Shelton (2007) provides
an extensive survey and examination of this literature.
Consequently an alternative empirical literature instead focusses on testing the hypothesis
within countries. Meltzer and Richard (1983) found some support for their hypothesis using
data from the US states, and relatedly Alesina et al (2000) found that public employment
was higher in US cities with greater levels of inequality. Borge and Rattsø (2004) found that
the tax burden shifts from poll taxes to property taxes with greater income inequality across
Norwegian local governments.
2Moreover, whether public goods are provided by government or by the private sector may theoretically
vary with inequality (Horstman and Scharf, 2008).
3A separate literature examines the relationship between cultural or social diversity and redistributive
policies, for example Bellani and Scervini (2015) and Freier et al (2016).
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This paper revisits international evidence, but asks a di¤erent, but basic, question: how
does income inequality a¤ect the composition of taxes? Arguably total expenditure (and
therefore total taxation under a balanced budget) is determined institutionally, or more
generally by factors other than the income distribution listed above. But the total size of
government is not the only policy lever. Even if the size of the public sector is taken as given,
governments still face unresolved questions on the appropriate composition of taxes. Perhaps
the most basic question here is the extent to which governments raise taxes on income as
opposed to expenditure. Indeed Crawford et al (2007) write that "(t)he appropriate balance
between direct and indirect taxation between income taxes and taxes on goods and services
 is one of the oldest issues in public nance, but still imperfectly understood." There is
of course an enormous literature analyzing optimal taxation, beginning with Diamond and
Mirrlees (1971), but relatively little in the way of a positive analysis of the political economics
of the tax composition decision.
A related literature examines the adoption of particular tax instruments, both historically
(Aidt and Jensen, 2009a and 2009b) and as an outcome or indeed a driver of the development
process (Keen and Lockwood, 2010; Besley and Persson, 2014). However, this literature
generally neglects the impact of income inequality on the adoption process.
This paper maintains the essence of the Meltzer and Richard (1981) framework, but
instead investigates the composition of taxes. In the model taxes may be levied on income,
or on expenditure. The preferred policy of the median voter is the unique Condorcet winner,
despite the fact there are two policy instruments, because across individuals the ideal policy
mix is still unidimensional in income.4 For any given level of total redistribution (and hence
4This is the condition of intermediate preferences identied by Grandmont (1978).
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total taxation), richer (poorer) individuals prefer increasing amounts of expenditure (income)
tax relative to income (expenditure) tax, and the median voter decides. Tax preferences
derive from comparing before-tax income, which is liable to income tax, with disposable
income, which is spent on consumption and thus liable to expenditure tax. The di¤erence
between before-tax income and disposable income is increasing with individuals position in
the income distribution, and hence tax composition preferences are monotonic in income.
In particular given a right-skewed income distribution the median voters before-tax in-
come is less than their expenditure, which is determined by disposable income plus redis-
tribution (nanced by aggregate taxation revenue). It therefore follows that a given level
of additional redistribution would cost more to them when nanced by expenditure taxes
than by income taxes, all else equal. However, because there are also di¤erent tax collection
costs (or deadweight losses) associated with the two policy instruments, an interior solu-
tion is feasible in the sense that both tax instruments will be strictly positive. The key
point is that as the median voter becomes poorer relative to mean income (and inequality
increases), income taxes will be increasingly preferred as a means of funding a particular
level of redistribution.
A similar approach is taken by Borge and Rattsø (2004) to analyze the mix of poll and
property taxes in Norwegian local governments. As with the present paper in their model
policy is three-dimensional, in their case consisting of an indiscriminate poll tax, a tax on
housing that increases with the house value, and spending on public services. Like us they
nd that increased inequality will increase demand for greater redistribution, via increasing
the (income-related) housing tax and reducing the poll tax.
Our theoretical ndings cohere with Meltzer and Richard (1981) in that greater inequality
4
monotonically leads to greater reliance on income taxes as a source of revenue. The results
relating to expenditure taxes are novel. At low levels of inequality, increases in inequality
also lead to higher expenditure tax rates because these are also redistributive (because the
rich spend more than the poor hence pay more taxes), and at low tax levels the deadweight
losses are relatively small. However, once inequality passes some threshold level, then there
is a stronger desire for redistribution, even if this comes at the price of greater deadweight
income-tax losses. The median voter now substitutes expenditure taxes for income taxes.
Nonetheless, an unambiguous nding is that the composition of taxes, dened as the extent
to which taxes are levied on income relative to expenditure, theoretically always rises with
inequality.
In a much more general framework than that considered here Winer et al (2009) also
analyze how the mix between income and consumption taxes changes with increased skew-
ness in the productivity distribution.5 In numerical simulations they also nd that income
taxes increase while consumption taxes fall with increased skewness. The present paper com-
plements this analysis by providing tractable solutions for the policy variables in question,
and moreover nds additional results such as the non-monotonicity in consumption taxes.
Furthermore we empirically analyze the resultant hypotheses.
We test our hypotheses using cross-country data from the World Development Indicators
for over 100 countries from the period 1990-2012. Data measuring the extent to which taxes
are levied on earnings relative to expenditure are consistently positively correlated with
measures of inequality. This stands in contrast to the evidence testing the standard Meltzer
5Their analysis includes heterogeneity in both tastes over public provision and political inuence as well
in the productivity distribution.
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and Richard (1981) hypothesis related to total government size. Moreover income taxes as
a percentage of total taxes increase, whilst taxes on expenditure as a percentage of total
taxes fall with increased inequality. The magnitude of the estimated e¤ects are quite large.
A one-standard deviation increase in inequality is associated with an increase in the ratio of
taxes collected from income to taxes collected from expenditure of around half a standard
deviation. These statistical relationships hold most signicantly in countries with higher
levels of democracy, in support of the mechanism proposed in this paper.
The next section provides a theoretical analysis of the political economics of income and
expenditure taxation. Section 3 contains the empirical analysis and section 4 concludes.
2 Model
The model is a simple extension of Meltzer and Richard (1981) to include expenditure
taxes as well as income taxes. As in that paper, individual expenditure (xi) is set equal to
disposable income,
xi = (1− ty) yi + r (1)
where ty is the income tax rate, yi is pre-tax (ex ante) income, indexed i across the population
and r is per capita redistribution. Hence expenditure will be higher (lower) than ex ante
income for low- (high-) income individuals. Consumption (ci) is less than expenditure,
because of the presence of an expenditure/consumption tax (tc), hence
ci = (1− tc) xi. (2)
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The government budget is assumed to balance so that redistribution in per capita terms is
nanced from consumption and income tax revenue, requiring
r = tcx+ tyy. (3)
Furthermore at the aggregate level income equals expenditure, thus
x = y. (4)
In order to maintain tractability the labor-supply decision is not formally modeled, hence
maximization of utility amounts to maximization of consumption (because consumption is
the only argument in the utility function). The pivotal voter/policymaker thus chooses the
triple q = {tc, ty, r} in order to maximize their own consumption. Substituting in (4), (3)
and (1) into (2) gives
ci = (1− tc) [(1− ty) yi + (tc + ty) y] (5)
hence the policy problem reduces to two dimensions (tc and ty). The important point of
departure from Meltzer and Richard (1981) is that there are now two tax instruments being
set. In general the Condorcet winner does not exist when the policy problem has two (or
more) dimensions, but the structure presented can be re-expressed in terms of (unidimen-
sional) intermediate preferences which means that the choice of the median voter will be
pivotal.6 Grandmont (1978) showed that as long as voters only di¤er along one dimension
6See Persson and Tabellini (2000) p. 25. Borge and Rattso (2004) also employ intermediate preferences
to solve a two-dimensional policy problem.
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(here, income), and that the indirect utility function (W (q; yi)) can be written as
W (q; yi) = J (q) +K (yi)H (q) ,
then the choice of the median voter is a Condorcet winner. It is clear that equation (5)
satises this requirement.
A nal ingredient of the model is that mean income declines with taxes, capturing tax
collection and/or deadweight costs. To model this we posit the reduced form relationship
_
y = y∗e−δyty−δctc (6)
where y∗ is potential income and δy and δc are parameters dening the sensitivity of actual
(taxable) income respectively to income and consumption taxes.7 The key properties of
(6) are that d
_
y
dty
= −δy
_
y and d
_
y
dtc
= −δc
_
y, hence that the proportionate deadweight losses,
d
_
y/dty
_
y
and
d
_
y/dtc
_
y
, are constant (therefore ruling out scale e¤ects). The parameters δy and δc
represent deadweight losses, either incurred directly as tax collection costs, and/or indirectly
in terms of their e¤ects on economic activity. These deadweight losses are non-negative, but
in order to generate a meaningful policy tension are less than the tax revenue that may be
raised, hence 0 < δy < 1 and 0 < δc < 1.
Technically equation (6) certainly facilitates the analysis, and should not be read as a
full depiction of how GDP responds to taxes. Nonetheless, we maintain that the arguments
of the paper would hold for other specications of how taxes a¤ect incentives. One of the
key arguments in Meltzer and Richard (1981) is that the median voter rationally anticipates
7Pickering and Rockey (2011) also posit a reduced form to underpin a similar leaky bucket argument.
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incentive e¤ects of higher taxation and hence sets taxes short of the top of the La¤er curve.
Regardless of functional form, for there to be a meaningful tension for the median voter,
then mean GDP will be falling with taxes (of either form). Equation (6) captures this basic
property. In appendix 2 we provide a brief analysis of some possible microfoundations for
this relationship, moreover establishing an argument that δy > δc, which, as shown below, is
required to ensure non-negative expenditure taxation.
One possible interpretation of high values of δy is high income tax collection costs.
8 As
discussed by Besley and Persson (2014), many countries cannot easily collect income taxes.
Arguably both δc and δy may be higher in the presence of a signicant informal economy.
Whilst the informal economy is not modeled here, it is intuitive that it is more di¢cult to
levy taxes (which would apply by construction to the formal sector) when economic agents
may easily migrate from the formal sector to the informal economy.
_
y, which here represents
the formal economy, would fall more readily with increased taxation.9 Nonetheless, across
groups of countries that are economically and institutionally similar, one might expect that
the cost parameters are also similar.
The median voter has income ym, and we dene m ≡
_
y
ym
> 1 as the operationalization of
inequality as in Meltzer and Richard (1981). Maximization of (5) with respect to ty, given
(6) yields
tc + ty =
(m− 1)
δym
. (7)
8The issue of tax collection costs is independent of the standard deadweight loss argument arising from
incentive e¤ects. One common reason given for low taxes in low-income countries is poor state capacity.
While we do not model the tax base explicitly, high values of δy (or δc) could reect a low tax base, at least
in a reduced form sense. A low tax base essentially by denition means high collection costs, and hence
potentially high GDP losses associated with attempted tax collection.
9La Porta and Shleifer (2014) also argue that agents choose informality as a means of avoiding tax.
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The mathematical derivations are contained in appendix 1. Equation (7) immediately de-
livers the well-known result in Meltzer and Richard (1981) that the total size of government
(i.e. tc + ty) is increasing in inequality (m). Moreover when choosing ty for given tc the two
instruments can be understood as perfect substitutes. Higher tc permits lower ty. However,
tc is not a given.
Maximization of (5) with respect to tc, and using (7), yields
tc =
(m− 1) [m (δy − δc)− (m− 1)]
m [δy (m+ 1)− δc (m− 1)] . (8)
Again appendix 1 contains more mathematical detail on how (8) is derived. Note that no
restrictions are required in order to ensure tc < 1. It is trivially clear from (5) that the
median voter will not want to set expenditure taxes in excess of 100% as this will mean
negative consumption. tc > 0 requires δy−δc > m−1m . For the median voter to desire positive
expenditure taxes at all, there has to be a wedge between δy and δc. Were δy and δc equal,
then income taxes would always (i.e. irrespective of m) be the preferred policy instrument.10
The reason for this is that when both types of tax are applied with equal cost (i.e. both
incur the same output loss) then the only concern left when choosing the tax composition
is redistribution. Given the structure of the tax system, income taxes are inherently more
redistributive (dollar for dollar) than consumption taxes. The latter always incur a cost to
expenditure, which for the median voter exceeds the cost in terms of (own) income when
income taxes are applied. However, when δy > δc, then the policy decision becomes more
10If unrestricted, then consumption taxes would be negative when δy = δc, i.e. a consumption subsidy
would be chosen. Indeed such policies have been observed at a microeconomic level at least. If such a policy
were implemented, then certainly income taxes would be the preferred means of raising revenue at least.
Nonetheless, the widespread existence of expenditure taxes empirically requires that δy be su¢ciently high.
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complex. (And appendix 2 provides some analysis of the labour-leisure choice that could
underpin the assumption that δy > δc). Income taxes may be preferred on the grounds that
ex ante income is less than actual expenditure, but if the tax collection costs are prohibitive,
then it becomes optimal for the median voter to instead choose consumption taxes.
Combining equations (7) and (8) yields
ty =
(m− 1)
δym
− (m− 1) [m (δy − δc)− (m− 1)]
m [δy (m+ 1)− δc (m− 1)] . (9)
As shown in the appendix ty > 0 requires no further assumptions. ty < 1 in fact follows a
fortiori from δy − δc > m−1m . The proof of this is in the appendix. The intuition here is that
δy is high enough such that income taxes will not be maximally set.
11
Using equation (8) and (9) the ratio of income to expenditure taxes is given by
ty
tc
≡ τ = δy (m+ 1)− δc (m− 1)− δy [m (δy − δc)− (m− 1)]
δy [m (δy − δc)− (m− 1)] . (10)
Proposition 1 Assuming that 0 < δc < δy < 1 < m, then the ratio of income to expenditure
taxes increases with inequality (m).
The derivative of equation (10) with respect to m is unambiguously positive under the
assumed conditions.12 Increases in inequality lead to increases in income taxes relative to
consumption taxes. The reason is that as inequality increases, then the median voter in-
creasingly prefers income taxes as a means of nancing redistribution for given tax collection
11This can also be viewed as a shorthand for the plausible general equilibrium result in Meltzer and Richard
(1981) that the labor supply will be su¢ciently elastic at high income tax rates.
12Details are in the appendix.
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(or deadweight output losses) costs.
It is also of interest to consider how income and expenditure taxes separately respond to
increases in inequality. The more straightforward case is income taxes. In this instance there
is no ambiguity: income taxes increase with inequality (dty
dm
> 0 - as shown in the appendix),
with exactly the same underpinning as that provided in Meltzer and Richard (1981) (who
only consider income taxes).
On the other hand the response of consumption taxes to increasing inequality is non-
monotonic. Taking for simplicity the case of δc = 0, the derivative of (8) with respect to m
is positive or negative depending on
(2δy − 3)m2 + 2m+ 1 ≷ 0.
Note that the rst term is unambiguously negative, hence dtc
dm
< 0 for large values of m.
The critical threshold is m =
2+
√
16−8δy
2(3−2δy)
. At levels of inequality below this, increases in
inequality lead to higher consumption taxes. At levels beyond the threshold, increases in
inequality lead to lower consumption taxes. The intuition for this non-monotonicity lies in
the fact that the median voter would all else equal prefer to pay income taxes rather than
consumption taxes. Both instruments achieve redistribution (holding all else equal), but at
low levels of inequality the median voters income is comparatively close to mean income and
the redistributive di¤erence (for the median voter) between the two instruments is relatively
small. Here increases in inequality result in both types of tax increasing, with the extent
depending on the collection costs or deadweight losses associated with each instrument. As
inequality increases, a stronger tension between the two instruments arises and the median
12
voter becomes disposed towards income taxes to the extent that they now substitute away
from consumption taxes towards income taxes. Even if income taxes entail higher deadweight
losses, they are still preferred because the tax burden to the median voter is reduced when
their ex ante income is (increasingly) lower than their expenditure.
Figure 1 depicts how taxes change with inequality under the (arbitrary) parameterization
δy = 0.9 and δc = 0.1.
13 The position of these curves change with these parameters, but
the key properties always hold given the conditions outlined. Income taxes monotonically
increase a la Meltzer and Richard (1981), whilst expenditure taxes rst increase and then
decrease with inequality. Note also that the gradient of the income tax curve is always higher
than that of the expenditure tax curve, hence dτ
dm
> 0 at all levels of inequality.
The model in this section is very stylized and omits several key features of any real-
world tax system. For example the marginal propensity to consume may fall with income.
This particular consideration would render the expenditure tax as regressive rather than
proportionate as above.14 In a median voter model this would potentially lead to a negative
relationship between consumption taxes and inequality. Hence the prediction that τ increases
with inequality would hold more strongly were this feature incorporated into the model.15
Despite its simplicity, the model sheds light on the tax composition decision in a median
voter model. Income taxes monotonically rise with before-tax inequality. When inequality
is initially at low levels, then increased inequality will also lead to increased demand for
13Note that for the economy to be on the upward slope of the La¤er curve, then using equation (6), then
d(ty
_
y)
dty
=
_
y (1− δyty) > 0 as long as δy < 1ty .
14In a simulation study Decoster et al (2010) nd indirect (expenditure) taxes to be unambiguously less
progressive than other components of the tax system in European countries.
15Further extensions could consider how institutions such as the voting rule (Lizzeri and Persico, 2001 and
Persson and Tabellini, 1999) or form of government (Persson et al., 2000), though lie beyond the scope of
the present paper.
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expenditure taxes. The rich spend more, and greater taxes serve to redistribute towards the
poor. However, this mechanism is eroded as inequality increases. Tax levels and associated
collection costs increase. The median voter now replaces expenditure taxes with income
taxes and beyond a certain threshold of inequality further increases in inequality lead to
reductions in expenditure taxes. Nonetheless, it is unambiguous that the ratio of income
taxes to expenditure taxes increases as inequality increases.
3 Evidence
The main agenda here is to ask whether the composition of taxes across countries system-
atically changes with inequality. Cross-country income and expenditure tax revenue data
are available from the World Development Indicators through 1990-2012. Despite over 20
years of data, there is much more variation in both the policy data and the inequality data
across rather than within countries.16 Consequently we report results from cross-country
regressions using within-country averages for all variables used in the analysis. This at least
has the advantage of removing any cyclicality from the data, which could also endogenously
vary with inequality.
The main dependent variable is constructed from the ratio of the percentage of tax
revenue taken from taxes on income, prots and capital gains and the percentage of tax
16For example, across the strong democracies (described below) the standard deviation of cross-country
mean inequality is 6.24, whilst the average within-country standard deviation is 1.39. For the main policy
variable (ln (τ) - described below) the standard deviation of the cross-country means is 1.02, whilst the
average within-country standard deviation is 0.261.
This feature of the data rules out what would be a scientically more desirable approach of examining
within-country change.
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revenue taken from taxes on goods and services, i.e.
τ =
ty
tc
=
Taxes on income, prots and capital gains (% of revenue)
Taxes on goods and services (% of revenue)
(11)
where both the numerator and denominator are taken from the World Development Indica-
tors (WDI) database. In practice rates vary with di¤erent forms of income (and at di¤erent
levels of income) and goods within countries, but the aggregate measure here is a means
of gauging the overall extent of taxes on income relative to taxes on expenditure. In the
regression analysis below we use the natural logarithm of τ because there are a small number
of outliers where the denominator in (11) is quite small.17
Arguably the numerator should only include personal income taxes, since there is no
production sector in the model. However, such data are not available in the WDI database.
Nonetheless the dependent variable as constructed still should cleanly characterize tensions
as identied in the theory above. In practice taxes on prots and capital gains, like income,
are more progressive in nature than taxes on expenditure. Increases in inequality would
plausibly shift preferred taxes not just towards income taxes, but similarly on taxes applied
to prots and capital gains. Data for taxes on personal income as a percentage of total
revenue, which more closely corresponds to the theoretical model, are available for 32 OECD
members and the correlation coe¢cient between these data and the WDI data for taxes on
income, prot and capital gains is 0.64.
Similarly the denominator ideally should only include consumption taxes rather than on
17For example Kiribati, Kuwait and Bahrain all generate less than 1% of their revenue from taxes on goods
and services. A further 13 countries derive less than 10%. In the analysis below we test whether the main
results hold up when countries with very low revenue from goods and services are excluded.
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all forms of expenditure given the focus of the model on voters. Systematic cross-country data
isolating taxation revenue derived from private consumption as opposed to other forms of
expenditure are not available - though given the fact that aggregate consumption typically
represents around 60% of GDP in most countries it seems likely that the data used are
reecting the underlying variable of interest.
As well as examining how ln (τ) varies with inequality we also separately analyze how
the separate tax measures are respectively a¤ected by inequality. The model above unam-
biguously predicts a positive impact of inequality on ln (τ) and ty, whilst the e¤ect on tc is
ambiguous.
We use two measures of income inequality in the empirical analysis. The rst is the
University of Texas Inequality Projects estimate of household income inequality (Galbraith
and Kum, 2005). These data (denoted UTIP ) are constructed using Theils T statistic to
measure pay inequality across sectors in each country. The second are measures of the Gini
coe¢cient (GINI) taken from Solt (2016). The two measures are not perfectly correlated
(the correlation coe¢cient is 0.37), which reects the fact the two series ostensibly are
measuring somewhat di¤erent concepts. Nonetheless, given undoubted measurement errors
in both series, using both enables a robustness check of the empirical work.
One important determinant of the capacity to tax is the level of development, so a rst
control variables used in the regression analysis is the natural log of GDP per capita in con-
stant chained PPP US$ (ln
 _
y

) from the Penn World Tables. OECD membership (OECD)
is also used as a further control, also to some extent capturing the level of development
and institutional capacity. Because the alternative tax instruments may redistribute across
generations to di¤ering extents, demographic variables (the proportion of the population
16
aged 15-64 and the proportion aged 65 and above) are also included in the analysis (denoted
PROP1564 and PROP65).
Countries raise tax revenue through means beyond taxation on income and goods and
services. One important source is revenue from customs and other import duties. For this
reason the trade share (exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP - denoted TRADE)
is also included in the regression analysis. In addition to these controls the log of the total
population size (ln (POP ), also from the WDI) is also included, to account for any scale
(dis-)economies associated with particular types of tax collection.18
A nal control variable is the quality of democratic institutions. The degree of democracy
may a¤ect policy variables directly, through channels other than that analyzed above, or
indirectly as a proxy for tax capacity. For this reason the POLITY 2 democracy score
is included in the regression analysis as standard. Moreover the median income earner
more plausibly drives policy under pure democracy. For this reason the sample is split into
countries which score highly on this measure and those that do not. The expectation is
that inequality will be more strongly related to the policy variables in the more democratic
subsample.
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics of the key variables used in the analysis below.
Note rst that there is considerable dispersion in both the tax variables. Countries di¤er
meaningfully in terms of how they raise tax revenue. Across the whole sample, taxes on
goods and services represent a higher fraction of total revenue than taxes on income. This
reects the fact that in low income countries, the capacity to raise income taxes is often
limited. Indeed within the OECD members, income taxes are around 32% of revenue, whilst
18Both the trade data and the population data come from the World Development Indicators.
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in the rest of the World income taxes are just 20% of revenue. These data are also consistent
with Besley and Persson (2014).19
The UTIP data cover 129 countries, and numerically range from below 30 (the Czech
Republic and Sweden) to 58.2 (Angola), with higher numbers representing greater inequality.
Notably, these data are negatively correlated with GDP per capita, with a Pearson correlation
coe¢cient of−0.66. Richer countries are measured (on average) to be more equal than poorer
countries (see Galbraith, 2008 for a discussion). This highlights the importance of controlling
for economic development, else the inequality measure will be proxying for other potential
drivers of policy. Interestingly the GINI data do not exhibit the same correlation with GDP
per capita, hence demonstrating the value of using more than one inequality measure.
Before presenting the main results we rst report regressions, in Table 2, where the size
of government, as measured by average total tax revenue as a share of GDP, is regressed on
inequality. This serves to recapitulate the consensus on the absence of evidence supporting
the Meltzer and Richard (1981) hypothesis that the total size of government increases with
before-tax income inequality. Column 1 is a simple regression with just inequality (UTIP )
and GDP per capita used as regressors. In that regression, as well as column 2, in which the
full controls are used, the size of government is not signicantly correlated with inequality.20
Signicance levels do not improve when the sample is split by the quality of democracy.
Column 3 contains results for countries with strong democratic credentials, with an average
19It is also noteworthy that ty and tc sum to (only) about 50% of total revenue. The main source of revenue
omitted is that from social security contributions. Because both (derived) benets and contributions from
social security contributions are typically related to wages (the Bismarck model of social insurance) it is
problematic to include these contributions in the analysis given that redistribution is lump-sum and uniform
in the model.
20The sample in column 2 is slightly smaller because the POLITY 2 data do not cover some of the countries
included in column 1.
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polity2 democracy score of 7 or above through the sample period.21 Column 4 contains
results for countries with POLITY 2 democracy scores of less than 7. In neither instance
is any statistical relationship found between the size of government and inequality. These
ndings reect those found for example in Perotti (1996), Bassett et al (1999) and Persson
and Tabellini (2003).22
Table 3 contains results when ln (τ) is used as the dependent variable. When looking
at the full sample both excluding (column 1) and including (column 2) control variables
there is a statistically signicant positive association between the extent to which countries
use income taxes relative to expenditure taxes and inequality. In columns 3 and 4 UTIP
is replaced by GINI and the results similarly demonstrate an increased tendency to use
income taxes as inequality increases.23
One possible concern lies in the fact that the empirical analysis focuses on tax revenue
data rather than tax rates. As constructed, the data can be interpreted as average tax rates.
However, given a progressive income tax structure it is possible that increases in inequality,
for given particular income tax rates and thresholds, could lead to higher tax revenue due
to the fact that the tax structure is progressive. Higher inequality would, ceteris paribus,
lead to a larger number of relatively rich individuals liable to pay higher income taxes. In
mitigation even here it would still be the case that the more unequal society e¤ectively
chooses to derive a greater fraction of its tax revenue from income taxes - consistent with
21This cut-o¤ was chosen for the simple reason that it results in two equally sized subsamples.
22Specically, in column 6 of Table 3.1 of Persson and Tabellini (2003) pp. 40. This regression uses the
Deininger and Squire (1996) measure of the Gini coe¢cient.
23When countries with less than 10% of tax revenue derived from goods and services are excluded the
signicance levels in both columns 2 and 4 actually improves.
In separate unreported regressions using τ rather than ln (τ) (and excluding these outliers) the estimation
results are statistically very similar to those reported.
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the model advanced in this paper. For example, given the potentially higher tax revenue
derived from greater inequality when the tax structure is progressive, a polity could decide
to lower specic income tax rates across the board. Here specic rates would fall, whilst the
average income tax rates (and revenue from alternative sources) could remain the same.
This issue can be investigated further making use of the personal income tax progressiv-
ity data developed by Rieth et al (2016). These data unfortunately only cover 30 OECD
countries, but still permit an exploratory analysis. Columns 5 and 6 of table 3 duplicate
column 1 respectively for two subsamples of low and high measures of personal income tax
progressivity.24 With the caveat that the sample size in both cases is very small, the results
indicate that if anything the relationship between ln (τ) and inequality is stronger in coun-
tries with low income tax progressivity indices, hence at least suggesting that it is not tax
progressivity that is driving the results.
Columns 7 and 8 of table 3 contain results replacing the numerator in the dependent
variable (11) with the OECD personal income taxation data. Again the caveat of a small
sample has to be applied, but still these results are consistent with the previous.25 When
the GINI inequality data are used (in column 8), there is again a positive and statistically
signicant relationship between the extent to which tax revenue is raised from income as
opposed to expenditure, and the degree of inequality.26
24The median of the Rieth et al (2016) tax progressivity measure is 0.142. Analogous regressions including
the control variables led to statistically insignicant results.
25Indeed as well as being fairly small the OECD sample also contains a number of relatively young (Eastern
European) democracies. There are 10 (out of the 32) countries that are not measured to be fully democratic
through 1990-2012 according to the POLITY 2 score.
26The UTIP measure of inequality performs worse in the OECD subsample. One possible factor here is
that UTIP is constructed using pay inequality within the industrial sector. In the case of OECD countries,
the services sector is quantitatively larger and also of particular importance in driving overall inequality.
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In table 4 the sample is separated according to its POLITY 2 score, measuring the extent
of democracy. Columns 1 and 2 use the UTIP inequality measures and split the sample
according to POLITY 2 ≷ 7 illustrating that the positive relationship holds only under
relatively more democratic regimes. This is consistent with the theory above, which relies
on a complete franchise. If the median voter earns more than median income then their
inclination towards redistribution will be much weaker. When the democracy criterion is
strengthened further, so that only countries with POLITY 2 > 8 (column 3), the magnitude
of the estimated coe¢cient increases and is statistically signicant at the 1% level.27
The results in columns 1-4 of table 4 establish that the estimated e¤ect is predominantly
driven by countries scoring very highly on the POLITY 2 scale. Notably these data are not
normally-distributed, as there is a cluster of (predominantly OECD) countries scoring 10.
Many of the regimes with intermediate POLITY 2 scores (even those with high positive
scores) are countries that have experienced substantial political volatility  including demo-
cratic reversals. This very likely creates further volatility in terms of scal policy decisions.
Columns 5 and 6 instead use the more abundant GINI data, which permits splitting the
sample according to whether or not POLITY 2 = 10, hence has been a perfect democracy
throughout 1990-2012. Both of the relevant coe¢cient estimates are positive and statisti-
cally di¤erent from zero. It is also noteworthy that the coe¢cient estimate for the perfect
democracies (column 5) is signicantly larger than that for the other regimes (column 6).
Using the coe¢cient estimate from column 3 of table 4, a one standard deviation increase
in inequality, as measured by UTIP , is statistically associated with an increase of 0.46 in
27The 11 countries that get dropped in column 3 relative to column 1 are Argentina, Botswana, Colombia,
Estonia, El Salvador, South Korea, Macedonia, Moldova, Paraguay, Romania and Turkey.
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the policy variable ln (τ), holding all else equal. Given that this is nearly a half of the
raw standard deviation in the policy variable, the magnitude of the estimated correlation is
sizable.28
The use of interaction terms provide an alternative approach to examining how the results
change with the extent of the franchise. In columns 7 and 8 of table 4 we make use of
a democracy indicator variable (DEMOCRACY ), dened a 0 or 1 depending on whether
POLITY 2 > 8. This indicator variable is then multiplied by the inequality measure thereby
generating an interaction term.29 The hypothesis here is that the relationship between the
tax composition measure and inequality will be increasingly positive under democracies,
hence that the coe¢cient estimate for the interaction term is positive. The estimation
results conrm this, although in neither instance are the results statistically signicant.30
One possible concern with these results is the presence of outliers. To check sensitivity
to these we computed DFFITS measures for each observation used in column 3 of table
4 following the procedure detailed in Welsch and Kuh (1977) and Belsey et al (1980).31
Four observations exhibit DFFITS measures greater than one in magnitude - Bolivia, Brazil,
Bulgaria and the US. Omission of any one, or indeed all four of these outliers does not change
28By means of comparison, using the same regression results, a one standard deviation increase in economic
development - as measured by log GDP - is estimated to increase τ by about 1.28. (Conrming the strong
role for economic development in determining the structure of taxes.)
29An alternative approach would be to interact POLITY 2 directly with inequality. The drawback of this
approach is that countries with intermediate POLITY 2 scores have tended to be politically more volatile
than those with extreme (and hence by construction stable) scores. Undoubtedly political stability has a
role to play in determining how taxes are raised, i.e. beyond inequality, although full consideration of this is
beyond the scope of the present paper.
30It is not impossible that similar political impetus prevails in the non-democracies, albeit via di¤erent
mechanisms.
31DFFITS measures are calculated as
byi−[yi(i)
s(i)
√
h(i)
where byi and [yi (i) are the prediction for point i with and
without point i in the regression, s(i) is the standard error estimate excluding i, and h (i) is the leverage for
point i (Belsey et al, 1980).
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the results substantively. In all cases the estimated coe¢cient is positive with comparable
magnitude and remains signicant at the 1% level.
In Tables 5 and 6 results are presented respectively for ty and tc, the numerator and
denominator in (11). In Table 5 the ndings for income taxes (ty) are quite similar to the
results found for ln (τ). Increases in inequality are generally found to be positively related
with the extent to which income taxes are used to raise total revenue, but moreso in the
stronger democracies. In countries where POLITY 2 ≥ 7, the estimated e¤ect remains
positive, though is not statistically signicant, whilst in countries where POLITY 2 < 7,
the estimated relationship is found to be negative, though at a very weak signicance level.
When the stronger democratic requirement is applied (i.e. where POLITY 2 ≥ 8), the
estimated e¤ect increases and is statistically signicant at the 5% level. Using the estimate
of column 5, a one standard deviation increase in inequality, is statistically associated with
an increase of 6.46 in ty, holding all else equal. As with ln (τ), this represents about half of a
standard deviation in the policy variable, so again the magnitude of the estimated correlation
is sizable.32 When the sample is rened further to those countries with POLITY 2 = 10
throughout 1990-2012, and utilizing instead the GINI measure of inequality, (in columns 7
and 8) the positive coe¢cient estimate is sustained, although statistical signicance is in this
instance low.33 Similarly, when the dependent variable is replaced by the OECD personal
32The somewhat high parameter estimate for POLITY 2 in column 3 is worth discussion. Notice also that
the parameter estimate for the POLITY 2 ≥ 8 subsample in column 5 does not have this outcome. For
both these subsamples there is not much variation in the POLITY 2 data (as it is truncated at 10). What
is happening here is that there are a number of countries with POLITY 2 scores between 7 and 8 (hence
relatively low values for POLITY 2 in this subsample) which have unusually low income tax revenue. For
instance Moldova (POLITY 2 = 7.78) and Serbia (POLITY 2 = 7.27) respectively raised only 5.22% and
15.95% of their total tax revenue through income, prots and capital gains taxation.
33If all controls except ln
 _
y

are dropped, then the p-value of the coe¢cient estimate pertaining to GINI
in column 7 improves to p = 0.076.
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income taxation data (in columns 9 and 10), the results are statistically insignicant.34
In the case of income taxes, some of the results relating to the control variables are of in-
terest. The proportion of the population aged over 65 years is consistently negatively related
to income taxes. This is consistent with the ndings of Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) who
found a robust negative relationship between labor tax rates and the dependency ratio. An-
other regularity in Table 5 is the positive relationship with income per capita. As discussed
in Besley and Persson (2014) this likely reects the greater capacity to tax in richer countries.
A further result is that the extent of democracy (POLITY 2) is positively associated with
the extent to which income taxes are used. If income taxes (relative to other forms of taxa-
tion) are more progressive, then given the plausible assumption that democratization means
that the median voter becomes relatively poorer, then this relationship would be expected.
Table 6 presents results relating to tc, the extent to which revenue is raised through taxes
on expenditure on goods and services. In contrast to income taxes, increases in inequality
are generally found to be negatively related with the extent to which expenditure taxes are
used, and again this result is especially strong in the stronger democracies. In countries
where POLITY 2 ≥ 7, the estimated relationship is negative and statistically signicant at
the 10% level, whilst in countries where POLITY 2 ≥ 8, the estimated e¤ect is statistically
signicant at the 5% level. Arguably this could simply reect a compositional e¤ect: greater
ty must mean less taxes raised elsewhere as a percentage of the total, hence correlations may
be reversed for tc. Nonetheless, because there are other meaningful sources of revenue the
results for tc are not just simply a mirror image for ty. Indeed the raw correlation between
34But as noted above, this subsample is actually quite diverse, arguably moreso than the subset of countries
scoring 10 on the POLITY 2 score.
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the two data series used is only −0.08 (for the subsample of democracies with POLITY 2 ≥ 8
it is still only −0.18).35 The coe¢cient estimate is also negative when the sample is rened
further to those countries with POLITY 2 = 10 throughout 1990-2012, and utilizing instead
the GINI measure of inequality in column 7. As with the income tax results the estimate
pertaining to the pure democracies (column 7) is larger in magnitude than that for the
rest (column 8), although statistical signicance is low.36 When the sample is restricted to
the OECD 32 for which personal income tax data are available (in columns 9 and 10) the
negative relationship between expenditure taxes and inequality is sustained.
Using the estimate of column 5 of Table 6, a one standard deviation increase in inequality
is statistically associated with an reduction of 5.06 in tc, holding all else equal. This represents
38% of a standard deviation in tc, so whilst this is slightly less than that found for ty this is
still a sizable e¤ect.
Again the results relating to the control variables are of worthy of some discussion. In
contrast to income taxes there is a negative relationship with income per capita - likely
reecting tax capacity, and the ability to raise taxes through income taxes in particular.
However, there are also some interesting di¤erences between the results for ty and tc. For
example, unlike the case of income taxes the demographic variables are not consistently
related with tc. There is also a consistent negative relationship between tc and trade (though
this relationship is not statistically strong). Globalization may constrain countries capacity
35At rst sight this correlation is low. Empirically countries with high levels of social security contributions
simultaneously have both lower ty and tc. This works against the inherent o¤setting e¤ect suggested in the
text (higher ty as dened permits lower tc). The two e¤ects are working in opposite directions hence the low
correlation in the two series.
36Again as with the estimates for income taxes, statistical signicance improves, this time to p = 0.08
when all the controls except ln
 _
y

are dropped from column 7.
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to tax goods and services - indeed arguably this puts more pressure on countries without the
capacity to tax elsewhere (see Khattry and Rao, 2002, and Baunsgaard and Keen, 2010).
Interestingly, and as found with ty the extent of democracy is positively associated with the
extent to which expenditure taxes are used. Essentially revenue sources outside of ty and tc
are increasingly relied upon, the weaker the level of democracy. Given that both forms of
taxes are progressive (in the weak sense that both instruments require the rich to pay more),
this nding is consistent with the model presented above.
In relation to income taxes the theory above generates an unambiguous hypothesis.
Greater inequality results in greater use of income taxes as a source of revenue. The data
are supportive of this hypothesis, at least in strong democracies. However, the hypotheses
relating to how taxes on expenditure are related to inequality are more nuanced. Increases in
inequality are proposed to increase expenditure tax rates at low levels of inequality, and once
some threshold level of inequality is reached, then the relationship becomes negative. In the
empirical analysis the relationship is unambiguously negative. To test for non-monotonicity
a quadratic term in UTIP is included in the analysis. Table 7 contains the results, in column
1 for the full sample, in column 2 for countries with POLITY 2 ≥ 7 and in column 3 for
countries with POLITY 2 ≥ 8. In all three cases the estimated sign on the point estimate for
the linear term (UTIP ) is positive, whilst the sign on the point estimate for the quadratic
term (UTIP 2) is negative, consistent with the theory above. However, in all three cases the
results are statistically insignicant.37
One possible way of reconciling these results with the model would be to argue that the
37This insignicance is underlined by the fact that the R2 is unchanged.
Similarly when the GINI data were used instead, the linear terms were estimated to be positive and the
quadratic terms estimated to be negative, though in all cases the results were statistically insignicant.
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observed inequality levels in the sample predominantly (or completely) exceed the threshold
value in the model. It is also possible that the model fails to fully account for the e¤ect
of inequality on expenditure taxes. As noted towards the end of Section 2 the marginal
propensity to consume may fall with income, which could lead to an unambiguous negative
relationship. More mundanely, it is also possible that identication of a clear non-linear
relationship would go beyond the capacity of the available data.
4 Conclusion
This paper analyzes how the composition of taxes is determined in a simple median voter
framework. Taxes may be levied on income, or on expenditure, as in the case of a sales tax.
In the framework analyzed the median voter is a Condorcet winner despite the fact there are
two policy instruments. The results relating to income taxes are familiar. As with Meltzer
and Richard (1981) greater inequality monotonically leads to higher income taxes.
The results relating to expenditure taxes are novel. At low levels of inequality, increases
in inequality lead to higher expenditure tax rates. Even though expenditure taxes are not
as e¤ective at redistributing as income taxes, there is still a redistributive impetus embodied
within an expenditure tax, as the rich spend more than the poor. If expenditure taxes are
preferred for separate reasons, perhaps because of smaller deadweight losses or collection
costs, then the standard argument - that greater inequality leads to higher taxes - also
applies to expenditure taxes.
However, once inequality passes some threshold level, then there is a stronger desire for
redistribution, even if this comes at the price of greater deadweight losses. The median voter
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now substitutes income taxes for expenditure taxes. Nonetheless, an unambiguous nding
is that the composition of taxes, dened as the extent to which taxes are levied on income
relative to expenditure, will rise with inequality.
Using cross-country data for tax composition from the WDI, and inequality data from the
Texas Inequality Project and Solt (2016), there is a consistently positive correlation between
inequality and the extent to which taxes are levied on income relative to expenditure. This
contrasts with evidence on total government size testing the original Meltzer and Richard
(1981) hypothesis. Moreover income taxes as a proportion of total revenues increase with
inequality, whilst expenditure taxes as a proportion of total revenues fall with inequality.
Given the nature of cross-country data, and in particular unobserved heterogeneity across
countries, it is not possible to say that these are causal relationships. Nonetheless, the fact
that the empirical results hold most strongly for countries with higher levels of democracy,
is supportive of the mechanism proposed in this paper.
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Appendix 1
Derivation of equations (7) and (8).
Inserting (6) into (5) for the median voter yields
cm = (1− tc)

(1− ty) ym + (tc + ty) y∗e−δyty−δctc

.
Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to ty gives
dcm
dty
= (1− tc)
−ym + y∗e−δyty−δctc − (tc + ty) δyy
and it is clear that the second-order derivative is negative hence the su¢cient condition is
also satised. Maximum consumption is therefore dened by
(1− tc) [y − (tc + ty) δyy − ym] = 0
(using y = y∗e−δyty−δctc.) Given that tc < 1, and dividing through by ym (hence using
m ≡
_
y
ym
) this requires
m− (tc + ty) δym− 1 = 0
which can be rearranged to give (7) in the text.
Similarly inserting (6) into (5) for the median voter and di¤erentiating with respect to tc
(again the second-order derivative is negative hence the su¢cient condition is satised) and
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setting the resulting expression equal to zero gives
(1− tc) [y − (tc + ty) δcy]− [(1− ty) ym + (tc + ty) y] = 0.
Dividing through by ym implies
(1− tc) [m− (tc + ty) δcm] = (1− ty) + (tc + ty)m
and substituting for (tc + ty) using (7) on both sides of this equation gives
(1− tc)

m− (m− 1) δc
δy

= 1− ty + (m− 1)
δy
.
Substituting for ty using (7) gives
(1− tc)

m− (m− 1) δc
δy

= 1 + tc − (m− 1)
δym
+
(m− 1)
δy
and nally rearranging for tc yields equation (8) in the text.
Proof that ty > 0.
Using (9), then ty > 0 requires that
(m− 1)
δym
>
(m− 1) [m (δy − δc)− (m− 1)]
m [δy (m+ 1)− δc (m− 1)]
and hence that
(δy − δc)m+ δy + δc > δym (δy − δc)− δy (m− 1)
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which must hold given 0 < δc < δy < 1 < m.
Proof that ty < 1.
Using again (9), then ty < 1 requires that
(m− 1)
δym
− (m− 1) [m (δy − δc)− (m− 1)]
m [δy (m+ 1)− δc (m− 1)] < 1.
In turn this implies:
(m− 1)mX < δym2X + δym (m− 1) [m (δy − δc)− (m− 1)]
where X ≡ δy (m+ 1)− δc (m− 1) > 0 and hence
(m− 1)X < δymX + δy (m− 1) [m (δy − δc)− (m− 1)] .
Note that the second term on the RHS is positive given δy − δc > m−1m . It therefore follows
that the inequality holds a fortiori if
(m− 1)X < δymX
which must hold because δy − δc > m−1m strongly implies that δy > m−1m .
Proof that dτ
dm
> 0.
Using the quotient rule, di¤erentiating (10) with respect to m gives
[(δy − δc)− δy (δy − δc − 1)] δyY − (δy (δy − δc − 1)) (X − δyY )
(δyY )
2
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where Y ≡ [m (δy − δc)− (m− 1)] > 0. dτdm > 0 therefore requires
(δy − δc)Y − (δy − δc − 1)X > 0
which is unambiguously positive given 0 < δc < δy < 1 < m.
Proof that dty
dm
> 0.
Rewriting (9) as
ty =
(m− 1)X − δy (m− 1)Y
δymX
,
and di¤erentiating with respect to m therefore requires
{X + (m− 1)D − δy [Y + (m− 1) (D − 1)]} δymX−δy (X +mD) [(m− 1)X − δy (m− 1)Y ] > 0
where D ≡ δy − δc > 0. This simplies to
δyX
2 − δyXY − δ2y (m− 1) (D − 1)mX + δ2ymD (m− 1)Y > 0.
Given 0 < δc < δy < 1 < m then X > Y and δyX
2 > δ2yXY. Given that these same
conditions also imply that D < 1, then the third term is also positive and hence dty
dm
> 0.
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Appendix 2
In this appendix we provide a brief analysis of some possible microfoundations for equation
(6), and concurrently an argument for the assumption that δy > δc.
Consider a very simple model where individual income is directly determined by their
labor supply (Li) according to Li = yi. Suppose the labor-leisure choice is governed by:
max
li
W = ci + β ln li
where li = L − Li is leisure, L is the xed time endowment and β is a taste parameter.
The log-linear functional form is not necessary for the main argument, but simplies the
exposition. Given equation (5) then
max
li
W = (1− tc)

(1− ty)
 
L− li

+ (tc + ty) y

+ β ln li.
Maximizing with respect to li and then solving for the labor supply gives
Li = L− β
(1− tc) (1− ty) + (1− tc) (tc + ty)
where  ≡ dy
dLi

= − dy
dli

. Equation (6) requires that the labor supply be falling with in-
creased taxation. In the case of income taxes,
dLi
dty
= −β (1− tc) (1−)
Z2
(A1)
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where Z ≡ (1− tc) [(1− ty) + (tc + ty)]. In the case of expenditure taxes,
dLi
dtc
= −β [(1− ty) + (tc + ty)− (1− tc)]
Z2
. (A2)
For particular (low) values of  the labor supply (and hence mean GDP) falls with increased
taxation (of either type).
Comparison of Equations (A1) and (A2) reveals that
dLidty
 > dLidtc
 if  is small, and
ty > tc. Under these conditions the extent to which labor supply falls with increased taxation
is greater in the context of income taxes than expenditure taxes, hence it is theoretically
feasible (and consistent with our analysis) that δy > δc. Moreover a more fully developed
model that for example considered labour demand as well as demand and supply for goods
and services could also conceivably generate this (or indeed the reverse) result, though a full
analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Figure 1: How Expenditure and Income Taxes change with Inequality
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
# obs mean s.d. min max
ty 158 22.26 12.12 0.604 64.36
tc 160 29.07 13.47 0.108 75.07
ln (τ) 157 -0.24 0.98 -2.80 4.57
ln
 _
y

166 8.63 1.26 5.60 11.22
UTIP 129 44.03 6.49 29.08 58.25
GINI 166 45.14 7.21 27.87 68.96
PROP1564 194 61.23 6.57 48.52 76.78
PROP65 194 7.00 4.62 0.81 18.39
TRADE 191 86.69 47.42 2.15 360.5
OECD 213 0.138 0.333 0 1
lnPOP 213 15.07 2.36 9.16 20.96
POLITY 2 165 3.03 6.20 -10 10
The data are within-country averages between 1990-2014. ty denotes taxes on income,
prots and capital gains (as a % of revenue) - taken from the World Development Indicators
(WDI). tc denotes taxes on goods and services (as a % of revenue) - also taken from the
WDI. τ = ty
tc
.
_
y is real GDP at chained PPPs in 2005 US dollars per capita - taken from the
Penn World Tables. UTIP is the University of Texas Inequality Project estimate of house-
hold income inequality. GINI are measures of the Gini coe¢cient taken from Solt (2016).
PROP1564 and PROP65 are respectively the proportion of the population aged between 15
and 64, and 65 and above. TRADE is imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP. OECD
is a dummy variable denoting OECD membership. POP is the country population size.
POLITY 2 is a measure of democracy provided by the Polity IV project, with 10 denoting
the highest level of democracy, and -10 denoting the highest level of autocracy.
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Dep Var: t
y
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UTIP −0.177
(0.147)
0.077
(0.198)
0.089
(0.209)
0.190
(0.301)
ln
 _
y

1.155
(0.786)
0.737
(1.368)
3.032
(1.599)
∗ −1.384
(1.595)
OECD 1.810
(2.803)
1.542
(3.242)
0.225
(3.577)
PROP1564 −0.195
(0.174)
−0.212
(0.219)
−0.023
(0.292)
PROP65 0.183
(0.204)
−0.236
(0.298)
0.516
(0.367)
TRADE 0.019
(0.022)
−0.033
(0.024)
0.047
(0.039)
ln (POP ) −1.460
(0.432)
∗∗∗ 2.489
(0.683)
∗∗∗ −1.127
(0.578)
∗
POLITY 2 0.254
(0.150)
∗ 0.987
(0.886)
0.103
(0.162)
Obs 119 112 56 56
Sample Full Full POLITY2≥7 POLITY2<7
R2 0.11 0.29 0.37 0.25
Table 2: Estimation Results - the size of government
Notes: Cross country regressions of total tax revenue as a percentage share of GDP including ln
 _
y

,
PROP1564, PROP65, TRADE, ln (POP ) and POLITY 2 as control variables described in
the text. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote
signicance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%.
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Dep Var: ln(τ) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
UTIP 0.076
(0.016)
∗∗∗ 0.027
(0.016)
∗ 0.118
(0.016)
∗∗ 0.061
(0.049)
0.041
(0.456)
GINI 0.035
(0.008)
∗∗∗ 0.019
(0.010)
∗ 0.046
(0.018)
∗∗
ln
 _
y

0.428
(0.259)
∗∗∗ 0.733
(0.138)
∗∗∗ 0.110
(0.056)
∗ 0.454
(0.160)
∗∗∗ 2.066
(0.701)
∗∗ 0.986
(0.562)
1.190
(0.426)
∗∗∗ 1.055
(0.350)
∗∗∗
OECD 0.374
(0.313)
0.546
(0.293)∗
PROP1564 −0.068
(0.022)
∗∗∗ −0.047
(0.024)
∗
PROP65 −0.082
(0.024)
∗∗∗ −0.083
(0.027)
∗∗∗
TRADE 0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
lnPOP 0.127
(0.058)
∗∗ 0.141
(0.057)
∗∗
POLITY 2 −0.012
(0.015)
−0.006
(0.014)
Obs 117 111 138 128 14 16 32 32
Sample Full Full Full Full Low Prog High Prog OECD OECD
R2 0.19 0.43 0.12 0.35 0.61 0.26 0.38 0.41
Table 3: Estimation Results: the composition of taxes
Notes: As for Table 2. Columns 5 and 6 divide the 30 observations of Rieth et al (2016) according to whether the
observed average personal income tax progressivity index lies below (column 5) or above (column 6) the median
value of 0.142. Columns 7 and 8 replace the WDI income + prot + capital gains data with OECD personal income
taxation data.
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Dep Var: ln(τ) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
UTIP 0.047
(0.024)
∗ 0.021
(0.023)
0.071
(0.021)
∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.022)
0.023
(0.016)
UTIP*DEMOCRACY 0.006
(0.005)
GINI 0.078
(0.028)
∗∗ 0.018
(0.011)
∗ 0.017
(0.016)
GINI*DEMOCRACY 0.004
(0.004)
ln
 _
y

0.859
(0.286)
∗∗∗ 0.561
(0.193)
∗∗∗ 1.014
(0.299)
∗∗∗ 0.629
(0.163)
∗∗∗ 1.917
(0.496)
∗∗∗ 0.395
(0.167)
∗∗ 0.689
(0.139)
∗∗∗ 0.435
(0.161)
∗∗∗
OECD 0.038
(0.432)
−1.204
(0.418)
∗∗∗ 0.161
(0.390)
−0.736
(0.408)
∗ −0.403
(0.463)
0.011
(0.356)
0.369
(0.294)
0.514
(0.293)
∗
PROP1564 −0.031
(0.041)
−0.035
(0.028)
0.019
(0.047)
−0.048
(0.025)
∗ 0.139
(0.045)
∗∗∗ −0.042
(0.025)
−0.066
(0.021)
∗∗∗ −0.045
(0.024)
∗
PROP65 −0.072
(0.029)
∗∗ −0.166
(0.041)
∗∗∗ −0.094
(0.036)
∗∗ −0.148
(0.034)
∗∗∗ −0.180
(0.032)
∗∗∗ −0.085
(0.029)
∗∗∗ −0.085
(0.023)
∗∗∗ −0.086
(0.026)
∗∗∗
TRADE 0.000
(0.002)
0.002
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)
−0.008
(0.004)
∗∗ 0.003
(0.002)
∗ 0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.002)
lnPOP 0.160
(0.093)
∗ 0.119
(0.087)
0.229
(0.100)
∗∗ 0.088
(0.080)
0.154
(0.121)
0.124
(0.063)
∗ 0.124
(0.059)
∗∗ 0.141
(0.058)
∗∗
POLITY 2 0.122
(0.115)
−0.008
(0.023)
0.115
(0.117)
−0.010
(0.020)
−0.003
(0.015)
−0.025
(0.020)
−0.012
(0.016)
Obs 56 55 45 66 26 102 111 128
Sample POLITY2≥7 POLITY2<7 POLITY2≥8 POLITY2<8 POLITY2=10 POLITY2<10 Full Full
R2 0.54 0.48 0.62 0.48 0.85 0.31 0.44 0.35
Table 4: Estimation Results - the composition of taxes
Notes: As for Table 2.
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Dep Var: ty (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
UTIP 0.524
(0.300)
∗ 0.185
(0.307)
0.586
(0.496)
−0.045
(0.448)
0.995
(0.435)
∗∗ −0.060
(0.391)
−0.092
(0.456)
GINI 1.472
(1.055)
0.259
(0.139)
∗ 0.303
(0.283)
ln
 _
y

4.576
(1.538)
∗∗∗ 6.770
(1.856)
∗∗∗ 8.078
(3.232)
∗∗ 5.523
(2.954)
∗ 15.254
(3.947)
∗∗∗ 4.530
(2.237)
∗∗ 30.81
(10.14)
∗∗∗ 5.410
(1.843)
∗∗∗ 13.15
(4.842)
∗∗∗ 13.61
(4.412)
∗∗∗
OECD 7.277
(4.703)
5.686
(6.861)
−3.330
(7.190)
7.307
(6.833)
−4.244
(6.516)
0.005
(7.650)
−1.280
(5.021)
PROP1564 −0.453
(0.321)
0.146
(0.577)
−0.257
(0.520)
0.403
(0.838)
−0.224
(0.433)
2.736
(1.513)
∗ −0.111
(0.289)
PROP65 −1.351
(0.420)
∗∗∗ −1.360
(0.602)
∗∗ −1.952
(0.733)
∗∗ −2.067
(0.750)
∗∗∗ −1.728
(0.615)
∗∗∗ −3.315
(0.655)
∗∗∗ −1.456
(0.412)
∗∗∗
TRADE 0.016
(0.025)
−0.037
(0.052)
0.034
(0.033)
−0.055
(0.053)
0.038
(0.030)
−0.205
(0.093)
∗∗ 0.026
(0.026)
lnPOP 1.921
(0.815)
∗∗ 1.101
(1.517)
2.006
(1.093)
∗ 1.404
(1.549)
1.885
(1.041)
∗ −1.499
(3.692)
1.643
(0.698)
∗∗
POLITY 2 0.539
(0.266)
∗∗ 3.322
(1.724)
∗ 0.733
(0.387)
∗ 0.602
(3.460)
0.485
(0.319)
0.293
(0.204)
Obs 118 112 56 56 45 67 26 102 32 32
Sample Full Full POLITY2≥7 POLITY2<7 POLITY2≥8 POLITY2<8 POLITY2=10 POLITY2<10 OECD OECD
R2 0.11 0.31 0.43 0.48 0.51 0.27 0.72 0.27 0.25 0.27
Table 5: Estimation Results - income taxes
Notes: As for Table 2. Columns 9 and 10 replace the WDI income + prot + capital gains data with OECD
personal income taxation data.
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Dep Var: tc (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
UTIP −0.892
(0.268)
∗∗∗ −0.317
(0.302)
−0.591
(0.342)
∗ −0.174
(0.445)
−0.779
(0.364)
∗∗ −0.001
(0.429)
−0.729
(0.360)
∗
GINI −0.627
(0.595)
−0.186
(0.193)
−0.616
(0.335)
∗
ln
 _
y
 −4.130
(1.493)
∗∗∗ −7.488
(2.093)
∗∗∗ −9.416
(3.232)
∗∗∗ −5.202
(3.844)
−8.226
(3.400)
∗∗ −6.819
(2.876)
∗∗ −16.77
(6.308)
∗∗∗ −2.770
(2.658)
−11.74
(4.083)
∗∗∗ −9.238
(3.227)
∗∗∗
OECD −1.394
(4.318)
1.508
(4.135)
32.98
(8.105)
∗∗∗ −2.470
(3.837)
15.39
(9.746)
5.839
(5.449)
0.931
(6.060)
PROP1564 0.891
(0.373)
∗∗ 0.603
(0.447)
0.517
(0.631)
0.034
(0.521)
0.629
(0.509)
−1.079
(1.012)
0.688
(0.463)
PROP65 0.296
(0.416)
0.212
(0.358)
1.270
(0.775)
0.297
(0.389)
1.277
(0.619)
∗∗ 0.915
(0.511)
∗ 0.228
(0.440)
TRADE −0.026
(0.023)
−0.031
(0.031)
−0.034
(0.035)
−0.039
(0.034)
−0.015
(0.032)
0.050
(0.041)
−0.058
(0.025)
∗∗
lnPOP −1.091
(0.833)
−2.172
(0.923)
∗∗ −0.541
(1.453)
−2.538
(0.998)
∗∗ −0.202
(1.255)
−2.574
(1.714)
−0.946
(0.995)
POLITY 2 0.464
(0.287)
0.326
(1.437)
0.614
(0.446)
0.220
(1.851)
0.429
(0.377)
0.295
(0.334)
Obs 118 111 56 55 45 66 26 102 32 32
Sample Full Full POLITY2≥7 POLITY2<7 POLITY2≥8 POLITY2<8 POLITY2=10 POLITY2<10 OECD OECD
R2 0.12 0.24 0.45 0.33 0.47 0.31 0.70 0.14 0.29 0.27
Table 6: Estimation Results - expenditure taxes
Notes: As for Table 5.
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Dep Var: tc (1) (2) (3)
UTIP 0.032
(1.867)
0.645
(2.093)
0.988
(1.903)
UTIP 2 −0.004
(0.022)
−0.016
(0.027)
−0.022
(0.025)
ln
 _
y
 −7.463
(2.075)
∗∗∗ −9.549
(2.613)
∗∗∗ −8.681
(3.532)
∗∗
OECD −1.295
(4.528)
1.631
(4.156)
−1.939
(3.825)
PROP1564 0.881
(0.373)
∗∗ 0.555
(0.462)
−0.024
(0.519)
PROP65 0.306
(0.406)
0.174
(0.362)
0.239
(0.400)
TRADE −0.026
(0.022)
−0.031
(0.032)
−0.039
(0.035)
lnPOP −1.106
(0.831)
−2.171
(0.935)
∗∗ −2.628
(1.015)
∗∗
POLITY 2 0.457
(0.295)
0.411
(1.493)
0.066
(1.837)
Obs 111 56 45
Sample Full POLITY2≥7 POLITY2≥8
R2 0.24 0.45 0.47
Table 7: Estimation Results
Notes: As for Table 2.
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